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Abstract 
This research tackles the issue whether what the most important 
components are in the legitimization process of the Iraq 
intervention of 2003 by the United States. It looks at the importance 
of the rhetorical commonplaces, or topoi – as introduced by 
relational constructivism –  in the legitimization process of the Iraq 
intervention and the threat of weapons of mass destruction. 
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1. Introduction 
‘This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice 
and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time. None 
of us will ever forget this day, yet we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good 
and just in our world.’ – President George W. Bush, 11th of September, 2001.1 
With the attacks on several targets in New York and Washington on September 11th 2001, more 
than a decade of US intervention commenced in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the link between 
the attackers from Al-Qaida and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was clear, the link with Iraq 
was not. With the State of the Union address in January 2002 by president Bush, a campaign 
for the support of an intervention had begun. A year later, a so called “coalition of the willing” 
was formed. 35 states, of which four (United States, United Kingdom, Australia and Poland) 
started a military operation in Iraq, under the leadership of the US. The other states gave support 
in other forms, such as support in the form of intelligence or political support. Before the 
formation of the coalition, a legitimization process had been the focus of the Bush 
administration. Without a decisive UN resolution for an intervention, Bush had to convince its 
population and the international political world of the legitimacy of his plans to invade Iraq. 
This thesis will address this process of legitimization of the intervention in relation to relational 
constructivism, a constructivist approach that focuses on the use of so-called commonplaces in 
rhetoric.  
The main research question in this thesis is: to what extend does the deployment of these 
commonplaces play a role in the legitimization process of the Iraq intervention by the US in 
2003? Before this research question can be addressed, a background knowledge of relational 
constructivism is to be provided. This theoretical framework will be outlined in chapter 2. This 
chapter will address relational constructivism as outlined by Patrick Jackson and his view of 
the legitimization process in relation to this theory. After having outlined this necessary 
knowledge of theory, the hypothesis of this research will be addressed. In chapter 3 a 
chronological analysis of different speeches – speeches that are representative of the 
legitimization process – will be displayed in historical context, after which chapter 4 will relate 
the findings to the relational constructivist approach. 
                                                          
1 George W. Bush, “Address to the nation” (Speech, September 9, 2001), American Rhetoric, retrieved from: 
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911addresstothenation.htm 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Relational constructivism 
In this thesis, a relational constructivist approach will be used and examined. Relational 
constructivism is a constructivist approach that focuses more on the social transaction, i.e. a 
process, where legitimation is the ‘key mechanism producing outcomes’2. This theoretical 
approach, as outlined by Jackson, will be briefly explained in this chapter.  
As Jackson also states in his article, the difference between relational constructivism and other 
constructivist approaches, lies within the agent-structure problem. In this problem the main 
question is whether social action is driven by agents or structures. For example, if an analyst 
from a non-relational constructivist approach tries to understand a state did something the way 
it did, the analyst will look at the state, and try to understand why it made that particular 
decision. However, the relational constructivist will look at the social transactions that make 
the state as it is, with emphasis on activities that have to do with legitimization3. Why is 
legitimization important and in many cases even necessary? As Jackson puts it, ‘because 
without such acceptance “the state” simply could not act’4 Therefore, relational constructivists 
do not look at the actions of a state and why the state acted that way, but looks at the continual 
process of legitimization along the way, as the legitimization process defines the actor and the 
legitimization process defines the way it can act. For example, when a state successfully (it is 
accepted as legitimate) puts a situation in a frame of “a threat”, it has created an environment 
where it can act with more exceptional measures than it did before (think of an invasion or 
sanctions). The legitimation process therefore is one of the causes of the origination of an 
invasion. To expand this further, where other theories only look at how and why a state acted, 
the relational constructivist approach also looks at how it could act the way it did. This is 
because from the perspective of relational constructivism, actors are limited in their actions by 
what they are able to legitimize. Without legitimization, there is no authority and without 
authority, the state cannot act, according to this logic. 
The second part in the relational constructivist approach is the question of how the 
legitimization process is constructed. The actor legitimizing a certain action does not come up 
with completely new arguments in its process, but draws upon “already existing” arguments. 
                                                          
2 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Relational constructivism: a war of words” in Making sense of International 
relations theory, ed. Folker, Sterling J. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2013)  p. 154 
3 Jackson, “Relational constructivism: a war of words”, p.154-155 
4 Jackson, “Relational constructivism: a war of words”, p.155 
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This does not mean that they are completely adopted, but they are arguments that (very vaguely 
described) are in the same “pool” of arguments. These pools are called commonplaces or, in 
more rhetorical jargon, topoi (sg. topos).5 A commonplace in this context is a “pool” that is 
content-oriented, ‘which makes them quite general, something even sententious and part of the 
common wisdom of a culture’6. Because of this the use of commonplaces or topoi is effective 
an gaining support of a certain audience, because the arguments are familiar and shared between 
the speaker and the audience, i.e. it is common knowledge or generally accepted opinions that 
have constructed itself throughout history and culture.7 Examples of some of these topoi are the 
arguments that stem from notions of liberty, terrorism (often correlated with 9/11) or the 
responsibility to protect (R2P).8  
Whether or not the arguments stemming from these topoi are true is not relevant, what is 
important whether these arguments are accepted, are seen as legitimate and the actions they 
therefore allow. There are multiple topoi available for each given situation, and it is possible to 
exercise multiple topoi as argument for a certain action.9 These topoi are best seen in speeches, 
congressional addresses and UN debates. 
This last notion is very important in the relational constructivist approach to the Iraq invasion 
Jackson used: he constructs the Iraq invasion (the ongoing process) in various topoi. Jackson, 
using speeches to back up his statements, classifies the legitimization process in two pillars: the 
US exceptionalism and the notion of ‘terrorism as uncivilized’.10 The first pillar as a topos is 
the notion of the United States’ values representing universal values. Because, according to 
this, the US has values that are in some sort universal, it draws upon arguments on how it has 
the authority to also act and decide on actions that are not only in the interest of the US, but in 
the interest of the entire (Western) world. Therefore the US has a higher authorization by which 
the US can justify not adhering to conventional rules and the United States can invoke more 
exceptional measures (for example, intervening without a solid UN resolution). The second 
pillar is putting the actions of terrorist and terrorist-sponsoring states in the frame of ‘barbaric 
and inhumane’. This particular framing meant that the subject of the action, the recipient (Iraq), 
                                                          
5 Jackson, “Relational constructivism: a war of words”, p.156 
6 Michel Meyer, What is the use of topics in rhetoric? Revue internationale de philosopie 2014 (4) 240, p. 448 
7 Ibidem 
8 Jackson, “Relational constructivism: a war of words” p.156 
9 Jacskon, “Relational constructivism: a war of words”, p. 157 
10 Ibidem 
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was placed outside ‘the bounds of civilized humanity’11, causing contesters of undertaking 
action automatically to be opponents of civilization and humanity.  
Bush therefore, Jackson argues, created in his legitimization process a social structure where a 
contester of the invasion automatically became an opponent of ‘the universality of the 
community in whose name and on whose authority the United States was acting’.12 Jackson 
uses this example of the Iraq war as evidence of the strong explanatory power of the relational 
constructivist approach. Thus, using his logic, he states that the use of “civilized” versus 
“uncivilized” and US exceptionalism as the base of Bush’ arguments, are the main factors in 
the origination of the 2003 Iraq invasion. 
Summarizing, Jackson states more than once that the commonplaces used are of the utmost 
importance in the US legitimization for intervention: ‘We must pay close attention to the 
particular rhetorical commonplaces deployed in debates about possible courses of action, as 
these commonplaces and their pattern of deployment as public reasons rendered the invasion a 
socially sanctioned activity.’13 In the conclusion, he adds: ‘It is only by drawing on existing 
traditions and commonplaces that they can feasibly convince their audiences to support 
deviations from the norm’14.  
These statements indicate that, following the logic of relational constructivism, the deployment 
of rhetorical commonplaces, or topoi, are the main drive for the legitimization process used by 
the United States.  
Therefore, the hypothesis in this thesis is:  
The use of rhetorical commonplaces (or topoi) is the main factor in the legitimization 
process of Iraq intervention, with an emphasis on the notion of “civilized” versus 
“uncivilized” and US exceptionalism. 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Jackson, “Relational constructivism: a war of words”, p.164 
12 Jackson, “Relational constructivism: a war of words”, p.166 
13 Jackson, “Relational constructivism: a war of words”, p.153 
14 Jackson, “Relational constructivism: a war of words”, p.167 
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3. Analysis of the legitimization process 
3.1 Speech analysis and the Securitization theory 
In order to analyze the arguments used by the United States in its legitimization process, a 
background on how to form such an analysis is necessary. The analytical tool used in this thesis 
stems from the Copenhagen School. As Barry Buzan has shown in his book ‘Security, a New 
Framework for analysis’, all speeches securitizing a certain situation or object (the referent 
object, the thing that is being threatened), are constructed in the same grammar. These notions 
are part of the securitization theory. The securitization theory is focused on more than just 
war/intervention legitimization, for example the securitization of national identity (for example 
Pim Fortuyn in 2001) or the securitization of environmental issues. Securitization is the 
acceptance of a speech act that places a referent object from the realm of conventional politics 
to the realm of security issues. In doing so, exceptional measures have become legitimate. Such 
a speech act is an example of a “performative utterance”. This means that by saying something, 
reality is changed. When a speech act is successful, reality is changed in the sense of that an 
issue has become a security issue.15 
In short, the speeches following this structure first state the referent object, the object that is 
being threatened, followed by a point of no return. This is the point where, if crossed, the 
survival of the referent object is at a very high risk. Because of this existential threat, 
exceptional measures have to be taken.16 This can be clarified with a simple hypothetical 
example. Country A feels threatened by the rising show of force (patrols, training exercises 
etc.) of neighboring country B. It tolerates this show of force, until one patrol crosses its border. 
Country A therefore securitizes the issue by performing a speech act. It states that the 
sovereignty is being threatened (referent object), that if nothing is done now country A will not 
be ready to protect its borders (point of no return), so it has to mobilize its troops immediately 
to place them at the border (exceptional measures). As stated before, a speech act of the kind 
can address more security sectors other than the conventional sector of state survival and 
military intervention.  
However, for this thesis and the case of Iraq, the scope will be narrowed to military 
interventions as exceptional measures (whereas the closure of all nuclear plants could be an 
exceptional measure in environmental issues). By using this theory, it will be able to see what 
                                                          
15 J.L.. Austin, How to do Things with Words (Oxford, Clarendon press, 1962), pp. 5-8 
16 Buzan, Waever & De Wilde. Security, A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 23 – 
26. 
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arguments are used to justify these measures, and, therefore, be able to see that the deployment 
of topoi in the legitimization process is overestimated by relational constructivism. In short, 
three terms are of particular importance in this analysis: the referent object, the point of no 
return and exceptional measures. By focusing on these three terms, the main arguments in the 
legitimization will be made clear. 
The speeches that will be analyzed are in the timeframe of January 2002 until the launch of the 
intervention on March 19 2003. Four out of five speeches are performed by President Bush 
(State of the Union 2002, General Assembly Address 2002, March 17 and 19 Public Statement), 
and one by Secretary of State Colin Powell (UN Security Council presentation 2003).  
For the sake of a complete understanding of how these speeches are constructed, the period 
leading up to timeframe of analysis is not to be neglected.  To understand the context of Iraq 
and the Iraq-American relations during the months running up to the invasion, one has to start 
at the Gulf war of 1990-1991, working its way up to the speech acts and the context in which 
they were given. 
 
3.2 The Gulf War and the 1990s  
After the Gulf war a status quo had presented itself in the Persian region. The United States had 
a great amount of military power on site, but not much influence in Iran nor Iraq. Iraq was 
weakened, but Saddam Hussein remained in power.17 In the time that followed, a US policy of 
containment on Iraq was imposed, with only attempts to weaken the Iraqi regime from within. 
Measures of containment and military pressure were, for example, inserting a no-fly zone over 
Iraq in 1992 and the deployment of 30.000 American soldiers near the border of Iraq in Kuwait. 
18  
Apart from the covert operations to overthrow Saddam Hussein from within, no military 
advances were made (besides some missile launches as retaliation). The world’s focus at that 
point was more on the tensions between Iraq and United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM), the commission created as a part of the truce after the Gulf war with emphasis of 
(chemical) weapons disarmament. Saddam Hussein had an inconsistent attitude towards 
UNSCOM, at one moment following a method of cooperation, at another following a method 
                                                          
17 F. Gregory Gauss, III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 
2010),  p. 88 
18 Gauss, III, International relations of the persian gulf, p. 123 
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of deceit and vagueness. In doing so, Saddam Hussein raised suspicion in the international 
theatre, what continued throughout the last decade of the 20th century.19 As in late 1990s 
Saddam Hussein began to expel more and more weapons disarmament inspectors from Iraq and 
for this reason congress (with a majority of republicans) started to pressure the Clinton 
administration to take a tougher stance on Iraq, causing congress to adopt the Iraq Liberation 
Act (an act in which the decision to allocate 100 million dollars to the Iraqi opposition was 
made). On the other hand, on an international level, Clinton was pressured on altering the 
sanction that were imposed on Iraq, because of the negative effects it had on its population, 
what manifested in UN security council resolution 986 (the resolution in which Iraq could sell 
oil in return for food for its population).  
The result of compromises such as resolution 986 was that Saddam Hussein started to resist 
UNSCOM even more. Quickly the cooperation started to decline as Hussein expelled all 
American inspectors. After pressure of the US they were accepted back in, but when reports 
came in Iraq still was not cooperating, the US held airstrikes for four days in Operation Desert 
Fox in 1998. UNSCOM’s cooperation with Iraq was over. 20 With resolution 1284’s United 
Nations Monitoring and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC) and the promise of the lift on 
sanctions another attempt was made to get inspectors into Iraq, but with oil prices rising (and 
thus favoring Iraq’s economy) and increasing opposition towards US policy, Saddam Hussein 
felt no need to agree to the deal.21 
10 years after the Gulf war the main change was the increasing US military presence in the 
region. Where first the Gulf monarchies were reluctant to allow American military power in 
right in their backyard, after the Gulf war they opened up to American bases and soldiers, and 
so the US had created a well-developed military infrastructure in the region. The US policy of 
containment had maintained throughout the years and the US had taken the responsibility for 
this containment.22 The UN sanctions, UNSCOM and the lack of cooperation with Iraq and the 
inspectors laid the foundation for the Iraq war, with 9/11 as the catalyst for the invasion. 
 
 
                                                          
19 Gauss, III, International relations of the persian gulf, p. 124 
20 Gauss, III, International relations of the persian gulf, p. 124-125 
21 Ibidem 
22 Ibidem 
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3.3 9/11  
Although there was no direct link between 9/11 and Iraq – the attack was planned in 
Afghanistan and executed by mostly Saudis – it was the turning point that created the context 
in which the Iraq War originated. Even though Osama Bin Laden was Saudi, the focus of the 
US wasn’t on Saudi Arabia but on Saddam Hussein.23 While immediate reaction was taken 
upon Afghanistan, preparations for war with Iraq were also taken. The first public mention of 
a possible campaign for support for intervention occurred in the State of the Union address in 
2002, on Tuesday January 29, where the famous term ‘axis of evil’ was coined. The states 
named to be part of the axis of evil (Iran, North Korea and Iraq) were states who supported 
terrorism or were producing WMD’s which they could hand over to terrorists.24  
As mentioned earlier, Iraq had expelled more and more UN inspectors late 1990s, and with 9/11 
still haunting the United States, the State of the Union’s (foreign policy) focus was mainly on 
Afghanistan and Iraq. President Bush commences with: ‘As we gather tonight, our nation is at 
war, our economy is in recession, and the civilized world faces unprecedented dangers.’25 After 
a short introduction on the accomplishments of the US military, Bush continues to more grave 
matter, thereby starting his first speech act. 
‘Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or 
our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have 
been pretty quiet since September the 11th. But we know their true nature. (…) 
Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi 
regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over 
a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of 
its own citizens – leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This 
is a regime that agree to international inspections – then kicked out the inspectors. This 
is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.  
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten 
the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a 
grave and growing danger. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the 
                                                          
23 Gauss, III, International relations of the persian gulf, 148 
24 Ibidem 
25 George W. Bush, “State of the Union 2002” (Speech, Washington D.C. January 29, 2002) White House 
Archives, retrieved from: https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-
11.html 
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United States. In any of these cases, the price would be catastrophic. (…) And all nations 
should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation’s security. (..) I 
will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will 
not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the most destructive 
weapons.’26 
If analyzed according the structure of the securitization theory, in this speech act the referent 
object is (the peace and survival of) the United States and its allies. The survival of the referent 
object is threatened by those WMD’s and the states that could provide them to terrorists.  This 
is the main reason why president Bush states that he will do whatever is necessary. This 
statement, emphasized in bold in the quote, is the announcement of potential exceptional 
measures. What these measures encompass, is not yet clarified in this speech. However, a begin 
of the legitimization process that follows this specific rhetorical structure, as Buzan et al. call 
it27, has been made. The speech act and securitization theory provide a helpful tool to dissect a 
larger text by looking only at the arguments that are used for the legitimization. In this text, it 
becomes clear that the threat of the weapons of mass destruction is at the core of this text. This 
also seen in the other texts, for example the General Assembly address by president Bush. 
 
3.4 General Assembly address 
The next speech in the campaign to win support for an intervention was president Bush’ address 
to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Hoping to win support internationally, Bush 
asked for the implementation of similar resolutions as implemented in the 1990s, stating that if 
the UN was unwilling to do so, the US would take it upon itself.28 After this statement, Saddam 
Hussein accepted UN inspectors back into Iraq. This second speech subject to analysis, almost 
to the day one year after the 9/11 attacks, shows an even bigger focus on weapons of mass 
destruction.  
Bush starts his address, after a few remarks on the foundation of the United Nations29, with the 
statement that the biggest fear of the United States is that terrorists get access to technologies 
                                                          
26 Ibidem 
27 Buzan, Waever & De Wilde. Security, A New Framework for Analysis, p. 26 
28 Gauss, III, International relations of the persian gulf, 149 
29 This is a standard rhetorical technique, following the ‘ethos’, ‘pathos’ and ‘logos’, where three different 
rhetorical tricks are used. With statements such as used in the first part of the speech he applies the ‘ethos’, 
where he establishes his authority in the environment the speech is given. Source: Sam Leith. You talking to 
me? London: Profile Books, 2012 
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of weapons of mass destruction, and moreover, stating that Iraq is the place where this threat 
could lead to reality. Directly after, he continues with a somewhat chronological course of 
events. Bush lists the number of times Saddam Hussein violated its promises and the UN 
resolutions30, from the moment Iraq invaded Kuwait till 1999. He points out how Saddam 
Hussein has worked against the United Nations and its inspectors time after time, while 
continuing to arm itself with weapons of mass destruction. After laying the foundation for his 
speech act, by stating that there will come a point of no return, he continues his attempt to 
persuade the General Assembly of the legitimization of exceptional measures. 
‘As we meet today, it has been almost four years since the last UN inspector set foot in 
Iraq – four years for the Iraqi regime to plan and to build and to test behind the cloak 
of secrecy. We know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when 
inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume he stopped when they left? (…)  
If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately and unconditionally forswear, 
disclose and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction (…) 
My nation will work with the UN security council to meet our common challenge. If 
Iraq’s regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq 
to account. (…) 
With every step the Iraqi regime takes toward gaining and deploying the most terrible 
weapons our own options to confront that regime will narrow. (…)’31 
These quotes show the United States attempt to gain international support, which it 
accomplishes partially. On the 8th of November, as stated before, the UN security council 
adopted UN resolution 1441. This was for the United States only partly a success because the 
resolution contained the agreement that if Iraq was to fail to meet the requirements made, the 
matter would return back to the UN security council, therefore not authorizing an intervention 
directly32. However, by emphasizing the point of no return in the speech act, the US had paved 
the path to intervention further and further. So far, what constructed the threat was mainly the 
lack of intelligence due to the absence of inspectors, not the intelligence on the presence of 
WMDs. However, this would change in the months after. 
                                                          
30 To be specific: resolution 686, 687, 688 and 1373. 
31 George W. Bush, “UN General Assembly address” (Speech, September 12, 2002) retrieved from: 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html 
32 UN Resolution 1441, Retrieved from http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf 
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In the time that followed, the UNMOVIC operation, was the center of attention. The documents 
Iraq provided, the statements by Blix and El-Baradei all did not satisfy the conditions for 
(mainly international) public opinion for support of an intervention.33 In the same period of 
time the United States laid out a new plan, the National Security Strategy, in which chapter V 
had the signatory title: ‘Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends 
with Weapons of Mass Destruction’, using strong language such as:  
‘At the time of the Gulf War, we acquired irrefutable proof that Iraq’s designs were not 
limited to the chemical weapons it had used against Iran and its own people, but also 
extended to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and biological agents. (…) We must be 
prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten 
or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and 
friends.34  
Later that year, congress adopted resolutions authorizing the Bush administration the use of 
force against Saddam Hussein, and less than a month later the UN Security Council adopted 
resolution 1441, which gave Iraq one last chance to cooperate with the UN inspectors, or else 
it would be in material breach. As stated in the resolution, failure to comply would mean a 
report to the Council for assessment, but the United States interpreted as an authorization for 
an attack, even though this interpretation was not shared with the majority of the United 
Nations.35 36  
 
3.5 Blix, El-Baradei and Powell 
In the time after the resolution all eyes were on the new UNMOVIC, the UN inspectors present 
in Iraq. Head of the UNMOVIC, Hans Blix, and head of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, Mohammad El Baradei, lead the operation. At the end of 2002 Iraq handed over a 
                                                          
33 Patrick Tyler, “A New Power in the streets”, New York Times, February 17, 2003, retrieved from: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/17/world/threats-and-responses-news-analysis-a-new-power-in-the-
streets.html 
34 “National Security Strategy”, The White House, accessed may 1, 2018, retrieved from https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss5.html 
35 UN Resolution 1441, chapter 4: ‘Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by 
Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the 
implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be 
reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below’. Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf 
36 Gauss, III, International relations of the persian gulf, 149 
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substantive document stating they were not in possession of WMD’s. Blix, however, pointed 
out to the UN Security Council that the document contained some inaccuracies, even though he 
also stated that Iraq was cooperating. Despite the inaccuracies in the Iraqi document, the 
progress in cooperation strengthened the states in the UN that were reluctant in following the 
US in its path to intervention. This caused the US secretary of state Colin Powell to provide 
evidence of WMD’s that came from US (and allied) intelligence. The prominence of 
intelligence on WMDs in the legitimization of exceptional measures (i.e. military intervention) 
becomes clear in this presentation. 
‘I asked for this session today for two purposes: Fist, to support the core assessments 
made by Dr. Blix and Dr. El-Baradei. As Dr. Blix reported to this council on January 
27: “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the 
disarmament which was demanded of it” (…) 
My second purpose today is to provide you with additional information, to share with 
you what the United States knows about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (…) 
[The facts on] Iraq’s behavior demonstrates that Saddam Hussein and his regime have 
made no effort – no effort – to disarm as required by the international community. 
Indeed, the facts and Iraq’s behavior show that Saddam Hussein are concealing their 
efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction.’37 
Colin Powell continues with presenting evidence, including taped conversations of military 
officials of the Iraqi army and, satellite photos and evidence of the existence of an committee 
that actively keeps UN inspectors of doing their jobs. Colin Powell further on states: 
‘These are not assertions. What we’re giving you are facts and conclusions based on 
solid intelligence. (…) 
Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqi’s are moving, not just documents and 
hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction to keep them from being found by 
inspectors. (…) 
                                                          
37 Colin Powell, “UNSC presentation” (Speech, february 3, 2003) retrieved from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa 
14 
 
As the examples I have just presented show, the information and intelligence we have 
gathered point to an active and systematic effort on the part of the Iraqi regime to keep 
key materials and people from the inspectors in direct violation of Resolution 1441. (…) 
The gravity of this moment is matched by the gravity of the threat that Iraq’s weapons 
of mass destruction pose to the world.’38 
Here we see that the United States, in the hope to bring more compelling arguments to the table, 
presents its own evidence. The speech acts thus far given, switch from a threat constructed by 
fear because of the lack of intelligence on WMDs (because of four years without inspectors), 
to US and allied intelligence indicating presence of WMDs. As clearly to be seen in Powell’s 
words, all the evidence shows that the point of no return at which George Bush hinted in his 
address to the General Assembly has been reached. The intelligence provided by the United 
States, according to the US, indicates that now exceptional measures are needed for the survival 
of the referent object. And so, on February 25 2003, the US (together with the UK) submit a 
draft resolution, containing the message that Iraq has failed once again in complying with 
another resolution, and that it missed its final opportunity for a peaceful solution.39 Even though 
domestic the belief in the validity of the intelligence on WMDs and support for the intervention 
was high40, it encountered opposition of a large part of the UN security council (especially 
Russia and France), causing it to be very unlikely to obtain authorization of the UN.41 Only 2 
weeks later, a revised version of the resolution of February 25 was submitted, stating that Iraq 
had until March 17 to disarm. 
On march 17, President Bush, in an address to the nation, announced that Saddam Hussein had 
48 hours to leave the country, or the US and its allies would feel forced to invade Iraq: 
‘Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraqi 
regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. 
This regime has already used weapons of mass destruction against Iraq’s neighbors and 
against Iraq’s people. (…) 
                                                          
38 Ibidem 
39 BBC News, “US and UK move against Iraq”, retrieved from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2792941.stm 
40 http://news.gallup.com/poll/8623/americans-still-think-iraq-had-weapons-mass-destruction-before-
war.aspx 
41 Gause, III, International relations of the persian gulf, p. 150 
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Before the day of horror can come, before it is too late to act, this danger will be 
removed. (…) 
The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will 
rise to ours. (…) 
Saddam and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result 
in military conflict commenced at a time of our choosing.’42 
Saddam Hussein did not comply. The threat to the referent object was still viable, so two days 
later, on march 19, George W. Bush addressed the nation once more: 
‘My fellow citizens, at this hour, American and Coalition forces are in the early stages 
of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from 
grave danger. (…) 
The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of 
an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder. We will meet 
that threat now’43  
During one year of attempts to rhetorical persuasion the legitimization process before the 
invasion ended with this two statements. Since the demands of the US were not met and the 
threat of the presence of weapons of mass destruction was still present, according to the later 
speeches even increased, intervention was unavoidable if the referent object were to survive. 
The legitimization running up to the actual intervention had thus far revolved around the threat 
WMDs caused for the peace and security of the United States and its allies. 
Now that the legitimization process from January 2002 up to the invasion has become more 
clear and the arguments have been distinguished from the texts, the next paragraphs will address 
the process in relation to relational constructivism. 
 
 
                                                          
42 George W. Bush, Address to the nation (Speech, march 17, 2003), retrieved from: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/17/sprj.irq.bush.transcript/ 
43 George W. Bush, Address to the nation (Speech, march 19, 2003), White House Archives, retrieved from: 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html 
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4. Discussion 
Although not contesting the statements made by Jackson about the use of these topoi by 
president Bush, there is one component Jackson overlooks in his analysis. Even though Bush 
later (after the invasion) lets go of this argument, in his first legitimization speeches, as seen in 
the analysis, he often states that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction (WMD’s). These 
accusations stem from US (and allied) intelligence, and appear (especially in the beginning of 
the legitimization process) to be a heavy factor in his speeches. 
The threat caused by WMDs does have a small place in Jacksons relational constructivist 
analysis, but under the pillar of terrorism as uncivilized. Jackson implicitly states that the 
WMD’s are part of the barbaric threat of Iraq, placing emphasis on the barbaric notion (as 
explained in chapter 2). Jackson also states in the conclusion of his research: ‘actions are caused 
by the specific configuration of rhetorical resources brought to bear at a given point in time’44. 
However, this presents us with a problem.  
Jackson states more than once that the commonplaces used are of the utmost importance in the 
US legitimization for intervention: ‘We must pay close attention to the particular rhetorical 
commonplaces deployed in debates about possible courses of action, as these commonplaces 
and their pattern of deployment as public reasons rendered the invasion a socially sanctioned 
activity.’45 In the conclusion, he adds: ‘It is only by drawing on existing traditions and 
commonplaces that they can feasibly convince their audiences to support deviations from the 
norm’46.  
These statements indicate that, following the logic of relational constructivism, the deployment 
of rhetorical commonplaces, or topoi, are the main drive for the legitimization process used by 
the United States. Does the application of Bush of these topoi, i.e. the invasion, not underplay 
the importance of intelligence about the WMD’s in the legitimization process? In other words, 
is the use of rhetorical topoi about the Iraqi threat more important than the intelligence that 
constructed the (perceived) threat? These questions can be answered by looking at the analyzed 
speeches. 
The quotes taken from the speeches in the previous chapter are selected, as mentioned before, 
on the on the three most important terms of the securitization theory in this analysis – referent 
                                                          
44 Jackson, “Relational constructivism: a war of words”, p.167 
45 Jackson, “Relational constructivism: a war of words”, p.153 
46 Jackson, “Relational constructivism: a war of words”, p.167 
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object, point of no return and exceptional measures. By focusing on these components, 
arguments used in a speech act are more easily distinguished, as they can be seen as the core of 
a legitimization in a speech act. In the speeches these components were predominantly visible 
as follows. The peace and security of the US (and its allies) is threatened by the acquisition and 
presence of WMDs (whether the threat is perceived or real is not relevant for the legitimization). 
For example: when the Secretary of State Colin Powell presented its evidence for the “validity” 
of threat, the point of no return was reached. At the point of no return, exceptional measures 
are needed to resolve the threat, and therefore the exceptional measures are legitimate. This is 
the basic structure of the legitimization process followed by the US.   
Although the topoi that Jackson points out are visible in the texts, they are not the dominant 
factor in the legitimization. Let us look back at the State of the Union address in 2002. By using 
phrases as “civilized world”, “axis of evil” and “their true nature”, Bush puts his enemies (Iran, 
North Korea and especially Iraq) in a position where they are morally separated from the rest 
of the world. The pillar of terrorism as uncivilized is clearly visible here. However, when 
looking for the referent object, point of no return and the exceptional measures, the focus is not 
on this pillar: ‘The United States will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten 
us with the most destructive weapons’47. Later on, in the General Assembly address and even 
more visible in the UN Security Council presentation by Colin Powell, the rhetoric shows that 
the point of no return is getting closer and closer. With the approaching point of no return, the 
use of the two pillars by Jackson decreases in importance and prominence in the texts, as the 
(intelligence on) WMDs becomes almost the only point of focus.  
So, in short, the legitimization process followed the following structure: the suspicion of the 
existence of WMDs constructed a threat to the peace and security of the US, which had its 
foundation in the absence of inspectors in the 4 years before 9/11. When Colin Powell presented 
evidence to the UN of those WMDs, the threat reached a point where intervention was needed 
to assure the survival of the peace and security of the US. This shows us that the main arguments 
the US drew upon were on intelligence on WMDs in Iraq. This was the legitimization strategy 
the US followed between 9/11 and the intervention in 2003. The whole strategy is based on the 
perceived threat of WMDs in Iraq. Thus, the pillars of terrorism as uncivilized and US 
exceptionalism are not the main factor in the legitimization of the Iraq intervention of 2003.  
                                                          
47 George W.  Bush, “State of the Union 2002”, as seen in the analysis chapter on page 7, last sentence. 
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Of course, by drawing on arguments from topoi such as the two pillars Jackson names, a speech 
act becomes more powerful. But by applying solely a relational constructivist approach, and 
therefore by stating that ‘It is only by drawing on existing traditions and commonplaces that 
they can feasibly convince their audiences to support deviations from the norm’48, the role of 
arguments of intelligence on WMDs in the legitimization process is heavily underplayed. These 
arguments do not stem from a topos or commonplace, because the intelligence on weapons of 
mass destruction are (presented as) facts. They are not common knowledge of more intangible 
general accepted opinions.  Therefore, because relational constructivism highlights the use of 
topoi, it, at least in the case of the Iraq intervention of 2003, underexposes the role of WMDs, 
the main argument.  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
48 Jackson, “Relational constructivism: a war of words”, p.167 
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5. Conclusion 
In the run up to the Iraq intervention by a coalition led by the US, the US implemented a 
legitimization process to attain a resolution by the UN and to gain international support. 
Relational constructivism states that in a legitimization process, the biggest role is assigned to 
arguments that stem from a content-orientated pool of arguments, which are called rhetorical 
commonplaces or topoi. Patrick Jackson, defending the relational constructivist approach, states 
that in the case of the Iraq invasion, the Bush administration focused mainly on arguments from 
two topoi – or pillars, as he calls it – the pillar of US exceptionalism and the second pillar, the 
framing of terrorism as uncivilized. 
US exceptionalism means that the US poses itself as the state that represents universal values 
(or at least shared by other Western states) and therefore its acts are justified, because it acts on 
behalf of the rest of the world. The framing of terrorism as uncivilized means that the US frames 
Iraq and the ties it has to terrorism as uncivilized, causing Iraq to fall outside the boundaries of 
conventional diplomacy and politics. To be against the US case for war in Iraq would therefore 
(that is the logic) to be against civilization or even humanity.  
Five speeches that are representative of the US legitimization process between September 2001 
and March 2003 are analyzed in this this thesis, using the three main components of the 
securitization theory as an analytical tool (referent object, point of no return, exceptional 
measures). The use of this analytical tool allows us to dissect a larger text by looking solely at 
the arguments used for the legitimization. By analyzing these speeches, it becomes clear that, 
even though these topoi are used in the legitimization process, the arguments drawing on (the 
intelligence) on weapons are mass destruction are prominent.  
The main reason the threat of WMDs originated was because after years of non-cooperation of 
Iraq with UN inspectors, Iraq had been without inspectors for four years when 9/11 happened. 
This caused the US to shift its focus to Iraq again, fearing it would have or would provide 
terrorists with WMDs. So, when president George W. Bush held its first State of the Union after 
9/11 the legitimization process for a potential intervention in Iraq was set in motion. In the 
months that followed, as seen in the speech acts analyzed, the same basic structure is to be seen. 
The legitimization process followed the following structure: the suspicion of the existence of 
WMDs constructed a threat to the peace and security of the US (the referent object). When 
Colin Powell presented evidence to the UN of those WMDs, the threat reached a point where 
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intervention was needed to assure the survival of the peace and security of the US (the point of 
no return and the exceptional measures). This shows us that the main arguments the US drew 
upon were on intelligence on WMDs in Iraq, not on the two pillars Jackson puts forward as the 
main arguments in the legitimization of the Iraq intervention of 2003. 
While absolutely not denying the deployment of topoi in the US legitimization process, it can 
be concluded that in the case of Iraq relational constructivism overplays the importance of the 
use of these rhetorical commonplaces, and underplays the importance of the arguments that are 
based on (the lack of) intelligence on WMDs in the legitimization process. Between September 
2001 and March 2003, the main factor in the legitimization process of the Iraq intervention is 
the perceived threat of the presence of WMDs in Iraq. 
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